The Battle of Tannenberg
August 26th-30th, 1914
The battle of Tannenberg was probably one of the most victorious battles of the first world war for the Germans. In this battle, the Germans successfully encircled Russian and troops causing them to surrender.
The Russians plan to advance into Germany territory was for the Russian's 2nd army lead by General Samsonov to move into the western corner of Eastern Prussia. While General Rennenkampf and the Russian 1st army would advance into Prussia through the North-East. The two armies planned to have a combined assult against General Prittwitz and his German 8th army. A few modifcations would be made to the Russian's plan after both Russian armies beat General Prittwitz and the German 8th army at the Battle of Gumbinnen. After this defeat and in fear of being encircled, Prittwitz and his men retreated to the River Vistula. Prittwitz would then be dismissed by German high command and be sent back to Berlin. He was replaced by the agressive dueo Paul von Hindenburg (who was brought out of retirement at 66) and Erick Ludendorff whom arrived to east Prussia on August 23.
Apon their arrival, Hindenburg immetietly reversed Prittwitz decision to withdrawl and then decided to allow a plan of action prepared by Prittwitz deputy chief of operations Colonel Maximilian Hoffmann. General Hermann von Francois and his German I corps were then transported by rail to the far southwest to meet Samsonov and his Russian 2nd army's left wing. Hindenburg's remaining two divisions under the command of Mackensen and Below were to await for the command to move South by foot to confront Samsonov's opposite right flank. Lastly a fourth corps was instrructed to stay at the River Vistula to meet Samsonov and his army as they made their way North. While the Germans were setting up there trap, Samsonov was stricken with communication and supply problems and was completely unaware that Rennenkampf had stopped to recopperate and thought that he was still moving to the south-west. Somsonov was also unaware of what the Germans were doing and he continued with his plan to exterminate the German eigth army at the Vistula.
On August 25, Hoffmann ordered Francois to attack Samsonov's left flank, but Francois rejected the ordered and instead planned to wait untill his artillery support was ready on the 27th. However, Francois agreed to attack Samsonov's left flank after both Hoffmann and Ludendorff visited Francois to repeat the order. On his was back, Hoffmann passed two intellegence unciphered intercepts that had been transmitted by Rennenkampf and Samsonov.
The first message was from Rennenkampf and revealed the distances from his army and Somsonov's army. It also stated that Rennenkampf marching plans were not to move towards the Russian 2nd army. This was very important to the Germans because they could now be assured that asistance could not come to aide Samsonov and his men. The second message sent by Samsonov stated what he thought to be a German withdrawl to Tannenberg & beyond, and his enroute to chase the German forces. With both intercepts,Hoffmann hurried and handed Hindenberg and Ludendorff the messges. While Ludendorff was unsure if the messages were real or not, Hindenburg altered the German eigth army's plan according to the intercept. Francois began his attack swiftly taking Soldau on the Russian border thus cutting off communication with Samsonov's center. His forces also confined Samsonov's left to the frontier. At this time, Ludendorff feared that Rennenkampf and the Russian army would join the fight. So he ordered Francois to move back north, another order ignored by Francois and he instead moved his troops east to stop and retreating Russians. Even thought Francois ignored Ludendorff's order, this action would later define the success for the Germans at Tannenberg.
In disregard to the warnings of a massive German advance moving to the south, the Russian army Chief of Staff Zhilinksi ordered Rennenkampf and his troops to the west to Konigsberg on August 26 (which was a considerable distance from Samsonov). Unfortunately, Zhilinksi's message to Rennenkampf was captured by Hindenberg and Ludendorff unciphered. They then dispatched Below and Bischofsburg to rejoin the German center and sent Mackensen to the south to meet up with Francois in Willenberg, south of Bischofsburg on August 29. Thus surrounding Samsonov and his men. At this point, Samsonov became aware of his fate, his commincation was shattered, his VI Corps already defeated so on August 28 he ordered a withdrawl that evening. But it was too late for Samsonov and his 2nd Russian Army. Out of 150,000 Russian troops : 95,000 were captured, 30,000 were killed and 10,000 escaped while the Germans only suffered 20,000 casulities. In addition to the Russian prisoners the Germans captured 500 guns. As for Samsonov, he shot him self in the surrounding forest along side with his aides in fear of having to report the disater to Tsar, Nicholas II.
The Russians plan to advance into Germany territory was for the Russian's 2nd army lead by General Samsonov to move into the western corner of Eastern Prussia. While General Rennenkampf and the Russian 1st army would advance into Prussia through the North-East. The two armies planned to have a combined assult against General Prittwitz and his German 8th army. A few modifcations would be made to the Russian's plan after both Russian armies beat General Prittwitz and the German 8th army at the Battle of Gumbinnen. After this defeat and in fear of being encircled, Prittwitz and his men retreated to the River Vistula. Prittwitz would then be dismissed by German high command and be sent back to Berlin. He was replaced by the agressive dueo Paul von Hindenburg (who was brought out of retirement at 66) and Erick Ludendorff whom arrived to east Prussia on August 23.
Apon their arrival, Hindenburg immetietly reversed Prittwitz decision to withdrawl and then decided to allow a plan of action prepared by Prittwitz deputy chief of operations Colonel Maximilian Hoffmann. General Hermann von Francois and his German I corps were then transported by rail to the far southwest to meet Samsonov and his Russian 2nd army's left wing. Hindenburg's remaining two divisions under the command of Mackensen and Below were to await for the command to move South by foot to confront Samsonov's opposite right flank. Lastly a fourth corps was instrructed to stay at the River Vistula to meet Samsonov and his army as they made their way North. While the Germans were setting up there trap, Samsonov was stricken with communication and supply problems and was completely unaware that Rennenkampf had stopped to recopperate and thought that he was still moving to the south-west. Somsonov was also unaware of what the Germans were doing and he continued with his plan to exterminate the German eigth army at the Vistula.
On August 25, Hoffmann ordered Francois to attack Samsonov's left flank, but Francois rejected the ordered and instead planned to wait untill his artillery support was ready on the 27th. However, Francois agreed to attack Samsonov's left flank after both Hoffmann and Ludendorff visited Francois to repeat the order. On his was back, Hoffmann passed two intellegence unciphered intercepts that had been transmitted by Rennenkampf and Samsonov.
The first message was from Rennenkampf and revealed the distances from his army and Somsonov's army. It also stated that Rennenkampf marching plans were not to move towards the Russian 2nd army. This was very important to the Germans because they could now be assured that asistance could not come to aide Samsonov and his men. The second message sent by Samsonov stated what he thought to be a German withdrawl to Tannenberg & beyond, and his enroute to chase the German forces. With both intercepts,Hoffmann hurried and handed Hindenberg and Ludendorff the messges. While Ludendorff was unsure if the messages were real or not, Hindenburg altered the German eigth army's plan according to the intercept. Francois began his attack swiftly taking Soldau on the Russian border thus cutting off communication with Samsonov's center. His forces also confined Samsonov's left to the frontier. At this time, Ludendorff feared that Rennenkampf and the Russian army would join the fight. So he ordered Francois to move back north, another order ignored by Francois and he instead moved his troops east to stop and retreating Russians. Even thought Francois ignored Ludendorff's order, this action would later define the success for the Germans at Tannenberg.
In disregard to the warnings of a massive German advance moving to the south, the Russian army Chief of Staff Zhilinksi ordered Rennenkampf and his troops to the west to Konigsberg on August 26 (which was a considerable distance from Samsonov). Unfortunately, Zhilinksi's message to Rennenkampf was captured by Hindenberg and Ludendorff unciphered. They then dispatched Below and Bischofsburg to rejoin the German center and sent Mackensen to the south to meet up with Francois in Willenberg, south of Bischofsburg on August 29. Thus surrounding Samsonov and his men. At this point, Samsonov became aware of his fate, his commincation was shattered, his VI Corps already defeated so on August 28 he ordered a withdrawl that evening. But it was too late for Samsonov and his 2nd Russian Army. Out of 150,000 Russian troops : 95,000 were captured, 30,000 were killed and 10,000 escaped while the Germans only suffered 20,000 casulities. In addition to the Russian prisoners the Germans captured 500 guns. As for Samsonov, he shot him self in the surrounding forest along side with his aides in fear of having to report the disater to Tsar, Nicholas II.